It would appear that control is enforced not just through policy — but through the visibility of that policy. Group Policy is more than a configuration engine; it's a heartbeat of sorts. Its presence is confirmed by .pol file writes, task scheduler events, and the comforting churn of compliance logs. In the eyes of the defender, this is stability.
But sometimes, the goal isn’t to break Group Policy. It’s to disappear under it — to allow policy to appear applied while staying completely untouched. This is an exploration of how to do just that, without triggering alarms, events, or suspicion. Not by disabling. Not by deleting. But by convincing the system that everything is fine.
Why Not Just Kill Policy?
Most red teamers already know the obvious routes:
- Disable the
gpsvcservice - Delete or corrupt
.polfiles - Stop
gpupdatefrom completing - Block outbound SMB to domain controllers
These methods work, but they’re loud. SIEM tools are tuned to notice the absence of expected signals. A missing scheduled task, a Group Policy error in the logs, or a long period without a registry.pol update — those anomalies are easier to catch than ever.
Instead, the aim here is to simulate compliance while suppressing enforcement — creating a synthetic heartbeat that satisfies monitoring tools without ever handing control to policy itself.
Objectives and Requirements
To be considered operationally viable, the approach must:
- Prevent local enforcement of Group Policy
- Keep
.polfiles (e.g Registry.pol) appearing updated - Avoid creating or modifying scheduled tasks
- Avoid interacting directly with gpupdate.exe, gpsvc or typical log sources
- Survive reboots without dropping files or services
- Leave minimal forensic trace on disk or in memory
This isn’t a brute-force approach — it's quiet subversion, designed for environments where evasion is just as critical as access.
Initial Exploration: Blocking Group Policy Application
Group Policy enforces configuration by writing to the registry and file system, primarily via:
%SystemRoot%\System32\GroupPolicy\- %SystemRoot%\System32\GroupPolicyUsers\
Registry paths under:
HKLM\Software\Policies\
HKCU\Software\Policies\
Blocking these paths, such as via ACL restrictions or junction point redirection, can indeed prevent policy from being applied — but not without consequences.
Problem:
- Most EDR solutions monitor changes to file system ACLs in sensitive paths.
- Permissions that prevent the system account from writing will break policy engine execution, which is itself a detection trigger.
- Junctions introduce weird behavior on update cycles and can break other system processes.
Simulating Life: The WMI Timer Plug-In
The key insight: defenders are often watching for absence, not authenticity. If registry.pol gets updated regularly, few systems check how or why — they just log the timestamp.
Enter WMI permanent event subscriptions.
Windows comes with a persistent internal automation layer that survives reboots, doesn’t require services, and isn’t tied to scheduled tasks. With it, we create an invisible timer that simply touches the .pol file — mimicking what Group Policy does, without running Group Policy.
Components:
__IntervalTimerInstruction— a hidden timer__EventFilter— listens for the timer ticksCommandLineEventConsumer— touches the.polfile invisibly__FilterToConsumerBinding— ties it together
Code Example
This line is executed in response to a WMI timer — not a task, service, or shell — and quietly updates the LastWriteTimeTo to make the file appear freshly applied.
Hiding in Plain Sight: The Power of Touch
Windows lacks a native touch command like Unix, so the workaround is setting LastRightTime using PowerShell. This keeps timestamps fresh without triggering actual policy processing.
You can even combine it with a fake .pol file (a real one copied from a clean system) to make the illusion stronger.
Even file integrity monitoring tools like Tripwire or Carbon Black will accept this as “normal” — especially if the timestamp cadence matches your organization’s typical Group Policy refresh interval (90 minutes by default).
Avoiding the Tripwires
This method avoids:
- Creating or modifying Scheduled Tasks
- Dropping files to startup folders or Run keys
- Changing service configuration
- Triggering
gpupdateor related Event Viewer logs
It leaves no PowerShell logs unless script block logging is fully enabled and WMI is actively monitored (which is rare outside hardened environments).
Potential Detection and Countermeasures
Yes, this can be detected — but only if defenders are:
- Actively monitoring
root\subscription - Logging WMI bindings (
__FilterToConsumerBinding) - Parsing PowerShell commands embedded in WMI consumers
But in many environments, WMI is a black box. That’s what makes this method so compelling.
Cleanup and Restoration
WMI subscriptions are easy to tear down once the op is complete:
You leave no footprint in the usual places.
Final Thoughts
Compliance isn't always about being right — sometimes, it's about being seen to be right.
When surveillance is based on signals, simulating signals is enough.
This technique shows that if you understand what defenders watch for, you don’t need to defeat them — you just need to blend in.
Because in systems ruled by policy, the illusion of policy is often stronger than the policy itself.